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sum judgment can be immediately executed and is safe from the danger of the
spouse's becoming judgment-proof or leaving the state." The judgment, being
recovered in a tort action, would not be taxable to the recipient,23 while alimony
24
is now subject to the federal income tax.
Thus if for any reason alimony is not a solution, the deserted family, under
the doctrine of the Johnson case as modified by the statute, has an alternative
remedy, at least where the enticer is a person of means and the family's income
is in a bracket where tax savings weigh more heavily than the difficulties of a
tort action and the cut in "take home" recovery by contingent attorney's
fees. In the usual case, however, the family's protection against the effects of
desertion, the "poor man's divorce," is not increased.

THE CANADIAN SPY CASE: ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE
OF STOLEN EMBASSY DOCUMENTS
An indictment was lodged against Fred Rose by the Attorney-General of
Quebec, charging him with having conspired with foreign and Canadian subjects in violation of several provisions of the Official Secrets Act. The Crown
sought to prove that the defendant, a member of the Canadian Parliament, had
communicated to a foreign power information which he had obtained illegally
as to the nature of Canada's munitions of war. To this end the prosecution submitted documents stolen from the Soviet Embassy by a former aid to the
Soviet military attach6, showing the existence of an extensive spy ring with
headquarters in a wing of the Soviet Embassy building. The active participation of Rose in this organization was also shown, particularly as regards his
securing the formula for the powerful explosive RDX from Dr. Boyer, a professor at McGill University. Over the objections of the defendant, the President
of the Assizes held the documents admissible in evidence. Although there were
other grounds for the appeal which was taken, Rose's conviction hinged upon
the final decision as to the evidence point. The Quebec Court of King's Bench
upheld the lower court's ruling, stating that since the executive had submitted
documents which might otherwise be held privileged for use in a prosecution of
one of its own citizens, and since the Soviet Government had made no claim to
immunity with respect to the documents, the courts had no jurisdiction to determine whether the documents were privileged and whether the executive had
committed a breach of international law. Rose v. The King.'
- The practical importance of this problem is shown in the fact that Judge Julius H. Miner,
in a recent report to the Circuit Court Executive Committee on the problem of children made
dependent by divorce, suggested that thought be given to the use of restraining decrees to
keep divorced fathers from remarrying until they are able to post bond to insure support of
dependents. Chicago Daily News, p. 4, col. 3 (November 22, 1947).
23 26 U.S.C.A. Int. Rev. Code § 22(b) (5) (1939)24 Ibid., at § 22(k).
1[947] 3 D.L.R. 618 (Que.).
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The court conceded that the privilege of diplomatic immunity given to an
ambassador by international law extends to himself, his personnel, dwelling,
documents, archives, and correspondence.2 If the diplomatic character of these
documents were in question, the case of .Engelke v. Musmann3 might be cited
as precedent for this decision. There the statement of the British Foreign Office
was held to be conclusive evidence of the diplomatic status of the defendant,
since such finding of fact depended upon matters peculiarly within the cognizance of the sovereign. Once the existence of the diplomatic status had been determined by the executive, however, it was admitted that it remained the function of the court to determine as a matter of law whether immunity from jurisdiction necessarily followed. Rose v. The King goes one step further in that the
court flatly stated that while the documents might otherwise be held privileged,
the question of the immunity to be granted them was strictly a matter for executive determination. Thus not only the nature of the documents but, more important, their legal incidents are deemed issues improper for judicial consideration.
Judge Gagne, while concurring in the result, indicated some doubt as to the
diplomatic character of the documents in question. The fact that the Bureau of
Espionage was situated in a wing of the Embassy building did not, in his
opinion, necessarily lead to this conclusion, since the Soviet Ambassador himself
was denied access to the room in which these documents were kept. In the Wolf
von Igel affair, the government of the United States expressed the opinion that
documents obtain an acquired immunity from the fact that they are under
official seal, that they are on Embassy premises, or that they are in the actual
possession of a person entitled to diplomatic immunity.4
The whole issue of whether these documents could properly be considered as
possessing a diplomatic character seems relegated to a position of irrelevancy
in the face of the opinion of Judge Bissonnette, apparently speaking for a
2Hyde,
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3 [i928] A.C. 433. Accord: United States v. Liddle, 26 Fed. Cas. 936, No. 15,598 (C.C.
Wash., i8o8); United States v. Ortega, 27 Fed. Cas. 358, No. 15,971; (C.C. Pa., 1825); United
States v. Benner, 24 Fed. Cas. 1084, No. 14,568 (C.C. Pa., i83); Ex parte Hitz, iii U.S. 766
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City of New York, 118 N.Y. Misc. z56, x93 N.Y. Supp. 577 (1922).
4Wolf von Igel, attached to the German Embassy in the United States, was indicted on
April 17, 1g16 in New York for using American territory as a base for hostile military operations. The German Ambassador demanded his immediate release and the return of papers
allegedly belonging to the Embassy, seized at the time of Von Igel's arrest. Secretary Lansing
asserted that the government of the United States was entitled to retain the papers in question
for use in the legal proceedings which had been instituted, since the room in which the arrest
had occurred had no connection with the Embassy and had not been used for the performance
of its diplomatic functions. The reply of the German Ambassador was that if the seizure of the
papers could be justified by a subsequent inspection of their contents, all diplomatic immunity
would speedily come to an end. No further action on the indictment was taken since Von Igel
was returned to Germany with other officials after the severance of relations between that country and the United States. Hyde, International Law 1267 (945).
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majority of the court. The fact that the documents are submitted in evidence
by the executive effectively precludes judicial inquiry into the possibility of
their being privileged communications. This tour de force is accomplished by
the aid of a legal fiction, namely, that once the documents come into the
possession of the executive, they become his property, free from any privilege
except that which he chooses to impress upon them.
It seems curious that such a result should be reached in view of Judge
Bissonnette's statement earlier in his opinion that modem public international
law rejects the theory of extraterritoriality as the source of diplomatic inviolability and prefers rather the necessity of recognizing a full dignity in the state
which delegates an ambassador.5 It seems, then, that if these documents do not
gain their immunity from the mere fact of their physical presence on Embassy
pr~mises, loss of immunity can hardly be attributed to their subsequent removal and change in possession. If, instead, the source of immunity is to be
found in the recognition of the independence and dignity of the foreign sovereignty, it is difficult to see how the finders-keepers test adopted by the court
can be expected to assuage the implied affront involved in such action on the
part of the receiving state.
The court stresses the fact that the Soviet Government had made no claim
to immunity in respect to the documents and that "to impose, through a
judicial decision, immunity upon a state which does not claim any would be
casting a slur upon its dignity and its sovereignty." 6 It is a well established
principle of international law that a diplomatic agent cannot waive his exemption from the territorial jurisdiction of the receiving state without the consent
of the sovereign whom he represents. 7 Moreover, it has been held that such
waiver must be strictly proved.8
Where the party before the court is neither the sovereign nor his ambassador,
however, it has been held that the claim of immunity will not be recognized
unless asserted through diplomatic intervention.9 The manner in which the
sIt has been suggested by Francis Deik that the rejection of the concept of extraterritoriality in the 19 th century was merely an attempt to deny, or at least restrict, the right of
asylum for a person threatened with criminal prosecution which was implicit in that fiction, but
that no further inroad upon the settled rules of diplomatic immunity was intended. 23 Amer.
J. Int. L. 582 (1929). To the same effect see i Oppenheim, International Law 629 (1928);
Lawrence, The Principles of International Law § 130 (1923); Foster, The Practice of Diplomacy 165 (x9o6).
6 Rose v. The King, [1947] 3 D.L.R. 6x8, 648 (Que.)
7Barbuit's Case, Cas. t. Tal. 281 (Ch. 1737); In re Suarez, [1918] i Ch. 176; Marshall v.
Critico, 9 East 447 (K.B., i8o8); Taylor v. Best, 14 C.B. 487 (1854); 1 Oppenheim, International Law 636 (1928).
8In re Republic of Bolivia Exploration Syndicate, Ltd., [1914] 1 Ch. 139.
9Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter and Carpenter,3oo Fed. 891 (D.C. N.Y., 1924). The
plaintiff corporation, the governmental railway administration of Sweden, claimed immunity
as against a counterclaim. In denying immunity, Judge Learned Hand stated that there is no
difference between a libel in rem, under which a ship is arrested, and an action in personam
against an agent of the sovereign. Reference was made to Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921),
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claim of immunity should be brought to an American court's attention was
made explicit by the case of Compaiiia Espailolade Navigad6n Marftina S.A.
v. The Navemar, 10 where it was held that the foreign government may assert
immunity from suit either as claimant in the court or through diplomatic
channels; if such claim is recognized and allowed by the executive branch of
the government, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the Attorney General of the United
States."
If the Soviet Government had decided to assert its diplomatic privilege directly by appearing formally in court and laying claim to the documents, it
would have run the risk of having such intervention held equivalent to recognition of the right of the court to assume jurisdiction over and to make final disposal of the property in question. If, on the other hand, the Soviet Government
had sought the intervention of the Canadian State Department, the executive
decision would have been binding upon the court. By holding that immunity
depends not solely upon the existence of a fact, but also upon proper assertion
of such fact, the courts have forced the foreign sovereignty to choose between
a procedural Scylla and Charybdis in order to claim its diplomatic privilege,
with the result that often appropriate relief has been denied. Where, as in the
present case, the court recognizes the property as that of a foreign sovereignty,
it seems unfortunate to hold that diplomatic immunity is a right capable of
being lost by a failure to put it in issue. If diplomatic immunity is to have
anything more than a mere verbal existence, the courts must exercise the only
effective deterrent to executive violation of international law, i.e., in the instant
case, refusal to permit the introduction in evidence of admittedly diplomatic documents and declining jurisdiction unless renunciation of the privilege can be
shown.
When called upon to decide questions affecting international relations,
where it was held that a claim of immunity in favor of an arrested ship must be made either
through direct intervention as a party by the sovereign, by his ambassador or minister, or
through the usual diplomatic channels resulting in a suggestion by the Attorney General.

Accord: The Pesaro,

255 U.S.

216 (1921).

1o303 U.S. 68 (1938). In a suit in admiralty by the owner to recover possession of a vessel
expropriated by the Spanish Republican Government, the Department of State declined to
present a suggestion of immunity claimed by the Spanish Ambassador, who then himself sought
and obtained leave to intervene. The Supreme Court held his allegation of ownership was not
conclusive and that the ship, therefore, was not immune from suit in American courts.

11Lamont v. Travelers Insurance Company, 281 N.Y. 362, 24 N.E. 2d 8 (1939) is an interesting sequel to The Navemar. It was there held that while the claim of immunity of the
Mexican Government was properly brought to the attention of the court, the language of the
suggestion filed by the United States District Attorney did not constitute a "recognition and
allowance" of the claim by the executive branch of our government such as would be conclusive
upon the court under the Navemar decision. By analogy, the argument could be made that
the submitting of the documents in evidence by the Canadian Government in the instant case
was a mere suggestion as opposed to such affirmative intervention as would be binding upon
the court.
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courts generally respect decisions expressly or impliedly made by the executive
branch of the government.Y2'It has been suggested that the emergence of the pothe courts
litical question doctrine in this field is due chiefly to the inability o'f
to act in the absence of applicable legal principles.13 This reasoning falls short
as an explanation for the present case, however, since diplomatic immunity
was one branch of international law which was regarded as having crystallized
sufficiently to permit its codification.'4
The practical reasons given by the court for its decision are more difficult to
challenge. The court argues that it would be impossible to give effect to diplomatic immunity in a situation such as this when to do so would be to counteract
the decision of the executive of the country. Due to distribution of sovereignty
among the various governmental departments, the executive branch has absolute and exclusive authority to determine policy in the field of international
relations. Issues such as these are essentially political in their nature and should
be resolved by those responsible and responsive to the community as a whole.
Moreover, in case of conflict the judiciary is without any effective -means of
enforcing its will.
In the absence of a world court with power to enforce its decrees, the law of
nations must be administered, if at all, by national courts, which are often
bound to find themselves in the uncomfortable position of being judge in their
own nation's cause. Prize courts have resolved this problem in a striking manner, as exemplified by The Zamora, s where an executive order in conflict with
principles of international law was not considered as binding upon it by the
court. This assertion of independence was not surprising in view of the fact that
traditionally prize courts have acted upon the principle that their duty is "not
to deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of particular national interest but to administer, with indifference, that justice which the
law of nations holds out without distinction to independent states."' 6
22The existence or non-existence of a treaty as a binding obligation upon the United States:
Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); Mahoney v. United States, io Wall. (U.S.) 62 (1869);
Doe v. Braden, i6 How. (U.S.) 635 (1853). The beginning and end of war: United States v. 129
Packages, 27 Fed. Cas. 284, No. 15,941 (D.C. Mo., 1862); United States v. Anderson, 9 Wall.
(U.S.) 56 (1869); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146 (i919). An assertion of
title to or jurisdiction over territory made by the political departments of the government:
Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. (U.S.) 253 (1829); Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (I9o7); In re Cooper,
143 U.S. 472 (1892). Recognition of a state or government: Rose v. Himely, 4 Cr. (U.S.) 240
(i8o8); Russian Government v. Lehigh Valley Co., 293 Fed. 135 (D.C. N.Y., 1923); Duff
Development Co. v. Government of Kelantan, [1924] A.C. 797.
13Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 485
(1924).

14Harvard Draft Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, Article 5 (1932):
"A receiving state shall protect the archives of a mission from any violation and shall safeguard
their confidential character wherever such archives be located within the territory of the receiving state.......
Is [1916] 2 A.C. 77.
,6Opinion of Sir William Scott in The Maria, i C. Rob. 340, 350 (1799). Accord: The
Walsingham Packet, 2 C. Rob. 77, 82 (i799); The Recovery, 6 C. Rob. 341, 348 (1807).
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Apparently it is possible for a national court to accomplish the herculean
task of recognizing, even in time of war, that "the seat of judicial authority is
indeed local, but the law [international] itself has no locality.1'7' England was at
war when The Zamora was decided, as was Canada thirty years later when the
Quebec Court of King's Bench was faced with Rose v. The King. The executive
departments in each case asserted a right in contravention of international law
to jurisdiction over property obtained by force. Such jurisdiction was conceded
by one tribunal in the interest of the safety of the state, and denied by the other
despite the existence of a national emergency similar to that which the Canadian
court felt gave such peculiar force to the policy of short run expediency.
The decision in Rose v. The King is illustrative of the ambiguous position of
international law in that, although the court admits its existence, the holding
that it could be disregarded at will by an interested sovereign state seems to
deprive it of the essential characteristics of law.!8 Diplomatic immunity has
been recognized as one of the most important elements in the preservation of
peace in the world community of nations.x9 It is in times of international tension that international law should be most doggedly adhered to in order to
avoid possible retaliation and eventual resort to self-help. Rose v. The King is
a disturbing precedent in that "as among men, so among nations, the opinions
and usages of the leading members in a community tend to form an authorita'
tive example for the whole."'
2

FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: A CONTROL
OVER CHOICE OF LAW
The defendant, a fraternal benefit society incorporated in Ohio, issued a
certificate of life insurance in South Dakota to a domiciliary of that state. After
the death of the insured, the plaintiff brought suit in South Dakota as assignee
of the beneficiary under the certificate. The terms of the certificate included a
provision, valid in Ohio,! limiting the period within which such suits could be
17The Maria, i C. Rob. 340 (1799).

X8See 26 Am. J. Int. L. 280 (1932) for an excellent discussion of the law of the land doctrine
evolved by the English common law courts when dealing with a conflict between municipal
and international law as contrasted with the prize court solutions of the same problem. It is
there suggested that the law of the land doctrine in origin seems to have been entangled with
the question of diplomatic immunity and particularly with the statute 7 Anne, c. 12 (1708).
9Secretary of State Hull made the statement that "it should be obvious that the unhampered conduct of official relations between countries and the avoidance of friction and misunderstanding which may lead to serious consequences are dependent in a large measure upon
a strict observance of the Law of Nations regarding diplomatic immunity." Department of
State Press Release 497, 498 (Nov. 7, 1935).
20Pollock, The Sources of International Law, 2 Col. L. Rev. 51i (1902); see also Hyde,
International Law 9 (1945).
I Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1940) §§ 9462-70, 9481; Appel v. Cooper Ins. Co., 76
Ohio 52, 8o N.E. 955 (1907); Bartley v. National Business Men's Ass'n, io9 Ohio 585, 143
N.E. 386 (1924).

